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WHEN DOES THE RENEWAL TERM VEST:
BEFORE AND AFTER THE COPYRIGHT
RENEWAL ACT OF 1992
Jeffrey M. Lowy*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States copyright statutes are a continually changing body
of law. In fact, the present copyright laws are the result of centuries of
development.' This evolution is most evident in the area of duration and
renewal of copyrights. For example, there are presently three relevant
copyright duration and renewal schemes. A federal copyright secured on
or after January 1, 1978, has a single term of copyright which exists for the
duration of the author's life plus an additional fifty years.2 A federal
copyright secured between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977, is
subject to a two-tiered durational approach as well as to the renewal
provisions of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992.? A federal copyright
secured prior to January 1, 1964, is subject to a two-tiered durational
approach, and there are conflicting views as to when the renewal term
vests.4
With so much change in such a large body of law, it is no surprise that
areas of ambiguity and conflict exist. One such area involves the vesting
date of the renewal term of copyright. The controversy over the proper
vesting date of the renewal term of copyright has continued for many years,
* The author would like to thank Professor Robert C. Lind for his ongoing dedication,
guidance, and assistance. Additionally, the author would like to thank Alan L. Shulman, Esq.,
Dana Lowy, Esq., Steven R. Lowy, Esq., Jay S. Lowy, Adjunct Professor Edward P. Pierson, and
Kimberly A. Tarnol for their assistance with this Article.
1. The United States Supreme Court explains that the first copyright laws created in this
country were based upon the English Statute of Anne. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647 (1943) (citing 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709) (Eng.)).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). However, a copyright in an anonymous work, pseudonymous
work, or a work made for hire exists for the duration of seventy-five years from the year of its
first publication or 100 years from the year of creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. §
302(c) (1976).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
4.2 MELVIL. B. NMMER & DAVID NIuzIM]l, NmmER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 9.05[A][2],
9.05[C][l][c], at 9-66 to -67, 9-80 (1992).
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and case law has only added to the uncertainty.' Determining the proper
vesting date is important because it will ultimately establish the the
continued existence and the proper owner of the renewal term of copyright.
In response to this conflict, Congress passed the Copyright Renewal
Act of 1992.6 Although this Act provides a method of determining the
proper vesting date of the renewal term of copyright, it only applies to
renewals which occur after December 31, 1991.' Therefore, the issue of
when the renewal term vests still exists for works initially protected by
federal copyright law prior to January 1, 1964, or in other words, for works
which must have been renewed by December 31, 1991.8
This Article examines the various duration and renewal provisions and
defines the proper vesting date for works renewed before and after the
enactment of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992. The main issue
addressed is whether the renewal term of copyright for works initially
protected by federal copyright law before January 1, 1964, vests upon
registration in the twenty-eighth year9 or upon commencement of the
twenty-ninth year.10 This narrow question is relevant when three events
have occurred: (1) the author assigns his right to the renewal term during
the initial term; (2) registration for the renewal term is made in the twenty-
eighth year during the life of the author; and (3) the author dies prior to
commencement of the twenty-ninth year.1 The outcome of this question
5. Compare Frederick Music Co. v. Sickler, 708 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) with
Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc., 953 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
6. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
7. Ir. § 102(g)(1)-(2).
8. NIMMER,, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][c], at 9-80. Nimmer states:
Mhe Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 eliminated the mandatory formality of
registration as a condition to subsistence of the 47 year renewal term. The other
principal innovation of the 1992 amendment was to declare, for the first time, a
Congressionally-mandated time of vesting. This declaration is prospective only.
With respect to works that first obtained statutory copyright through 1963-and for
which renewal was therefore required by the end of 1991-the new law exerts no
impact. For all such works, therefore, the Marascalco/Sickler dispute remains alive.
I.
9. The 1976 Copyright Act provides that all terms of copyright extend to December 31st of
-the year in which the copyright would otherwise expire, and, therefore, the renewal registration
can be made until this time. 17 U.S.C. § 305 (1976).
10. Howard B. Abrams, in his treatise, acknowledges this issue by devoting a section to it
entitled, "When Does the Renewal Vest?" 2 HoWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §
11.03[C][6], at 11-21 (1991).
11. Although the resolution of the proper vesting date of the renewal term will also determine
the rightful claimant as between the author's estate and the author's statutory successors, this will
not be the focus of this Article. Id.
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has great significance because it determines ownership of the renewal term
between the author's assignee and statutory successors.
Only two recent cases, each resulting in contrary conclusions, have
directly addressed this issue. The first case is Frederick Music Co. v.
SickIer."2 After analyzing the plain meaning of the statute, commentator
opinions, and judicial dicta, the district court held that the renewal term
vests upon registration of the renewal term with the Copyright Office, in
the twenty-eighth year of the initial term, during the life of the author. 3
In the second case, Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc.,"4 the issue of when the
renewal term vests was also directly addressed. The district court held that
an assignment of a renewal right is a mere expectancy that will only vest
if the author survives the initial term.15  The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.
1 6
This Article argues the position espoused by the court in Frederick
Music: for works initially protected by federal copyright law prior to
January 1, 1964, the renewal term of copyright should vest upon registra-
tion with the Copyright Office, in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term,
12. 708 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court stated the issue in this case as follows:
[W]hether the right to a renewal copyright vests in the author or his assignee on the
date when the copyright is renewed during the statutory period prescribed for renewal
and during the author's lifetime, or whether it vests only at the commencement of the
renewal term, provided the author survives into that term.
Il at 589. The case involved a conflict regarding the right to the renewal term in the song
"Night Train.' Id. at 588. The plaintiff, Frederick Music Company, claimed the right to the
renewal term as an assignee of co-author Jimmy Forrest. Id The defendant, Don Sickler,
claimed the right to the renewal term as an assignee of Betty Tardy Forrest, the widow of the co-
author. l The plaintiff registered for the renewal rights in the twenty-eighth year during the
life of the author, but the author subsequently died prior to the commencement of the renewal
term. Id.
13. i at 592. If the court found against the plaintiff and required that the co-author survive
into the renewal term, the copyright may have fallen into the public domain because the co-
author's widow never filed for renewal. Alternatively, the widow (or the widows assignee) may
have had a valid renewal based on a constructive trust theory, but because the court found in
favor of the plaintiff, this theory was not tested. lId at 589 n.2.
14. 953 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991). The case involved a dispute over the rights to the renewal
term of the song "Good Golly Miss Molly." Id. In 1956, John Marascalco and Robert Blackwell
co-wrote the song. kI Fantasy was the assignee of the renewal right in the song. Id. Blackwell
died in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term, subsequent to registration for the renewal term.
lId at 470. Blackwell's daughters assigned all their interest in the song to Marascalco. Id.
Plaintiff Marascalco claimed the right to the renewal term, as assignee of Blackwell's one-half
interest in the renewal term. Id. Defendant Fantasy disputed this claim. Il
15. Id
16. Id at 476.
17. 708 F. Supp. 587.
1993]
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during the life of the author. This argument is based upon the statutory
construction, dicta and opinions of the courts, the majority of the comment-
ators' opinions, and policy considerations. Additionally, this Article will
explain when the renewal term vests for works subject to the Copyright
Renewal Act of 1992, and will describe the benefits accorded those
registering for the renewal term during the twenty-eighth year1 8
II. WHEN DOES THE RENEWAL TERM VEST:
BEFORE THE COPYRIGHT RNEWAL ACT OF 1992
A. Statutory Construction
1. The Renewal Provisions in the United States Copyright Statutes
Prior to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992
The present copyright laws in the United States are embodied in the
Copyright Act of 1976.9 All works created on or after January 1, 1978,
receive copyright protection for the life of the author plus fifty years after
the author's death.' The 1976 Copyright Act is the first United States
copyright statute to have such a durational scheme.2 All previous United
States Copyright Acts contained a two-tiered durational approach whereby
protection was available for two distinct terms of copyright: an initial term
and a renewal term.' The 1976 Copyright Act also provides for these
two distinct copyright terms for works already in their initial term of
protection on January 1, 1978.' Although this Article will interpret the
present Copyright Act, much of the analysis will also involve § 24 of the
18. The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 adopts the "vesting upon registration" approach for
the renewal term, which is consistent with the decision in the Frederick Music case and the
argument made in this Article. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][21, at 9-81.
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
20. ld. § 302(a).
21. Dorothy M. Schrader, Vesting Date of the Renewal Copyright Interest, 19 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 277, 278 (1972). The United States is now in conformity with the
duration/renewal approach of other countries. Id. "Other countries generally base the term of
copyright on the life of the author plus a fixed term of years." Il
22. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 124; Copyright Act of February 3,
1831, ch. 26, § 2, 4 Stat. 436; Copyright Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 88, 16 Stat. 212;
Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
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1909 Copyright Act, a provision virtually analogous to § 304(a) of the1976 Copyright Act.25
2. The Plain Meaning of the Renewal Provisions
Prior to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992
As explained above, under the 1976 Copyright Act, works initially
protected by federal copyright law prior to January 1, 1978, are subject to
the two-tiered durational approach.2 The initial term of copyright
protection is for a period of twenty-eight years, with a renewal term
available for an additional forty-seven years.' Section 304(a) of the 1976
Copyright Act states as follows:
Copyrights in their first term on January 1, 1978. Any copyright,
the first term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall
endure for twenty-eight years from the date it was originally
secured: Provided ... That in the case of any... copyrighted
work, ... the author of such work, if still living, or the widow,
widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or
if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then
the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his or her next
of kin shall be entitled3= to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for a further term of forty-seven years
when application for such renewal and extension shall have been
made to the Copyright Office and duly registered therein within
one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copy-
right:29 3 And provided further, That in default of the registra-
24. The 1909 Copyright Act was re-written in 1947. The text of § 23 of the Copyright Act
of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, is the same as 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909).
25. NMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[AI[1], at 9-64. "Apart from [the] extension in duration,
however, the thrust of the two statutes is identical, so that a construction of one should be deemed
to apply to the other." l "With these purposes in mind, Congress enacted the renewal provision
of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.). With respect to works in their original
or renewal term as of January 1, 1978, Congress retained the two-term system of copyright
protection in the 1976 Act." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219 (1990).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
27. Id.
28. Black's Law Dictionary defines "entitle" as follows: "In its usual sense, to entitle is to
give a right or legal title to. To qualify for, to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or
claiming." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
29. When read in conjunction with § 305 of the 1976 Copyright Act, it appears that the one
year period to register for a renewal is January 1 through December 31 following commencement
of the twenty-eighth year. BMI, SoNGwRrERs & COPYRIGHT QUESTONS AND ANSWERS 9
1993]
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tion of such application for renewal and extension, the copyright
in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight years
from the date copyright was originally secured.3°
This section's plain meaning indicates that the renewal term vests
when registration is made with the Copyright Office, in the twenty-eighth
year of the initial term, during the life of the author.3 1 Absent an assign-
ment of the right to the renewal term, if the statutory requirements are
satisfied, the author is entitled to the renewal term of copyright. 2
Therefore, it follows that if the author has made an assignment of the
renewal term, his assignee is entitled to the renewal term if the author is
alive at the time of renewal registration.33 Additionally, if the author died
prior to registration of the renewal term, then the statutory successors of the
creator would be entitled to the renewal, provided that they satisfied the
registration requirements.' The plain meaning rule of statutory construc-
tion states that if the language of the statute is clear on its face, there is no
reason to interpret the legislative history. In Frederick Music, the court
(1992).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
31. Frederick Music Co. v. Sickler, 708 F. Supp. 587, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Marascalco v.
Fantasy, Inc., 953 F.2d 469, 476 (9th Cir. 1991) (Thompson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1997 (1992).
32. Schrader, supra note 21, at 277. This is true even if the author assigned the right to the
initial term of copyright. Id. at n.1.
33. Frederick Music, 708 F. Supp. at 589; Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 476 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
34. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc. 362 U.S. 373, 376 (1960). The Supreme
Court Stated:
The hierarchy of people granted renewal rights by § 24 arefirst, the author if living;
second, the widow, widower, or children, if he or she is not living; third, his or her
executors if the author and the widow, widower, or children are not living; fourth,
in absence of a will, the next of kin.
Id. (emphasis in original). *
35. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 46.01-.07, at 81-
133 (1992 rev.).
The plain meaning rule of statutory construction has also been applied to the 1976
Copyright Act. Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 552 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (S.D.N.Y
1982) ("While there can be no rule against resort to legislative history to aid the construction of
the meaning of words ... however clear the words may appear on superficial examination, it is
equally clear that a plain reading of an unambiguous statute cannot be eschewed in favor of a
contrary reading, suggested only by the legislative history and not by the text itself.") (citation
omitted)); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1984) (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 184 (1984)) ("In construing a federal statute it is
appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed
'accurately expresses the legislative purpose."').
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analyzed the plain meaning of § 304(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act and
concluded that the language of the statute grants the author an entitlement
to the renewal term upon registration.36 The court stated that "the renewal
copyright plainly vests in the author or his assignee upon application and
registration with the Copyright Office, if the author is still living at the time
of such application and registration."'37 Because the court found the
statutory language to be unambiguous, it chose not to analyze the legislative
history.38 In fact, the court was particularly pleased by the clarity of the
language in § 304(a) because both the plaintiff's and defendant's briefs
stated that the legislative history is silent as to when the renewal term
vests.39
In Marascalco, the defendant Fantasy also argued that pursuant to the
plain meaning of § 304(a), the right to the renewal term should vest in an
assignee upon registration in the twenty-eighth year during the life of the
author.' Fantasy claimed that the phrase "shall be entitled to" in § 304(a)
means that the renewal interest vests "when" registration is made.41 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Fantasy's understanding of
the plain meaning of the statute. Because there was room for different
interpretations of the meaning of § 304(a), the court ruled that the statute
is not clear on its face.42 The court interpreted the phraseology as
describing merely a necessary condition to enable the acquisition of the
36. Frederick Music, 708 F. Supp. at 589. The court stated:
The language of the statute is clear. If a copyright is renewed by or on behalf of the
author during the statutorily provided period, the author becomes "entitled" to the
extension of the original copyright And this entitlement arises "when application for
such renewal and extension shall have been made to the Copyright Office and duly
registered therein."
Id.
37. Id.
38. Id
39. Id. The court cited both the plaintiff's and the defendant's briefs and stated:
To this Court, the language of the statute is unambiguous and thus needs no
clarification from legislative history-which is fortunate since, as all sides agree, the
legislative history is silent on the issue of when renewal rights vest. Given this
silence, the Court adheres to the plain meaning of the statutory language.
Id.
40. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 470.
41. Id. "Fantasy's analysis suggests that registration is a sufficient condition for vesting
2. Id.
42. Id at 470-71.
19931
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renewal rights.43 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
Fantasy's plain meaning argument because it believed that the statutory
language is susceptible to more than one interpretation.' 4
The language of § 304(a) is unambiguous. The statute clearly states
that the renewal term shall vest upon registration. There is no express
survivorship requirement.45 The Marascalco court held that the renewal
term does not vest until commencement of the renewal term.' In order
to so hold, it was imperative for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to find
the plain meaning of the statute to be ambiguous. Finding this ambiguity
was necessary to obviate the plain meaning rule so that the legislative
history could be analyzed in order to find a survivorship requirement. The
Ninth Circuit's finding that there was room for more than one interpretation
of the statute was an outcome-oriented reading of the statute which was
necessary to overcome the plain meaning. A competent reading of the
statute leaves no room for ambiguity, nor a finding of a survivorship
requirement.
Dorothy M. Schrader, the Assistant Chief of the Examining Division
of the Copyright Office, also argues that the plain meaning of the statute
suggests that the renewal term should vest upon registration.47 The 1909
Copyright Act explicitly states that the author must be living to renew the
43. Il at 470.
If a renewal interest is to vest at all, it must be perfected by a timely registration
application. The clause following "when" addresses itself to the mechanics of filing
a timely registration application. So read, the statute suggests that Congress was
intent on specifying the time for registration and not the time for vesting.
Moreover, the statutory language must be construed as a whole. The phrase
"shall have been made" gives meaning to the word "when." It signifies that filing
of a renewal application is a condition precedent to vesting. If, in addition, "when"
was intended to indicate vesting of renewal rights, the logical phrasing would be
"when application is made" rather then "shall have been made."
Id. at 470-71 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 471. In its plain meaning argument, Fantasy also claimed that under § 304(b), it
is the act of registration which secures the renewal term; therefore, by analogy, the same is true
under § 304(a). Id Section 304(b) states, "[t]he duration of any copyright... for which renewal
registration is made between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, is extended
to endure for a term of seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured." IL
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1976)). The court disregarded this argument because § 304(b) was
designed for the unique situation of when a copyright becomes eligible for a renewal within the
year before the 1976 Act took effect; therefore, Congress did not address the time-of-vesting issue
because it treated the copyright as if it were already in its second term. Id.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
46. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 476.
47. Schrader, supra note 21, at 298.
COPYRIGHT RENEWAL ACT OF 1992
copyright.' Obviously, there is some significance to this "if living"
requirement. It seems logical that the "if living" requirement refers to
when registration is made, because renewal must be made in the twenty-
eighth year during the life of the author.49 Conversely, it would be
illogical for the "if living" requirement to refer to the twenty-ninth year
because it is immaterial whether the author is living on the first day of the
renewal term if there was no registration in the twenty-eighth year.5
Therefore, if the "if living" requirement is to have any significance, the
logical interpretation of the statutory language implies that the renewal term
should vest upon registration.
3. The Legislative History of the Renewal
Provisions Prior to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992
As previously explained, the meaning of § 304(a) is quite clear: the
renewal term vests when registration is made with the Copyright Office, in
the twenty-eighth year of the initial term, during the life of the author.
Although there is currently no requirement that the author survive until the
commencement of the twenty-ninth year for the renewal term to vest, early
United States Copyright Acts contained such a condition." Even if
Congressional intent were analyzed, the legislative history fails to explain
why Congress deleted this requirement.52
The vesting date of the renewal term becomes an issue when an author
assigns the right to the renewal term of copyright and then dies in the
twenty-eighth year. Although not explicitly stated in the statute, the United
States Supreme Court has held that an author may convey the right to the
renewal term.53 This holding is consistent with the first Copyright Act,
48. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075. "[The author... if still
living,... shall be entitled to a renewal." I&
49. Schrader, supra note 21, at 298.
50. Id
51. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. "124; Copyright Act of February 3,
1831, ch. 26, § 2, 4 Stat. 436.
52. Schrader, supra note 21, at 284.
53. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943). The Court held
that "the Copyright Act of 1909 does not nullify agreements by authors to assign their renewal
interests." Id.
19931
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the English Statute of Anne,5" which was also interpreted to allow assign-
ments of the renewal term.55
For the renewal term to vest, the Statute of Anne expressly required
that the author be alive at the expiration of the initial term.55 In 1790,
Congress enacted the first United States copyright statute.57 The duration
and renewal provisions of the 1790 Copyright Act were virtually identical
to those in the Statute of Anne.58 Two terms of copyright were available:
an initial term of fourteen years and a renewal term of fourteen years.59
Similar to the Statute of Anne, the renewal term would not vest unless the
author was still living at the expiration of the initial term.6 Additionally,
the 1790 Act required the author to comply with the registration require-
ments within the six month period prior to the expiration of the initial
term.
61
54. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709) (Eng.). See also Schrader, supra note 21, at 280.
55. Fred Fisher, 318 U.S. at 647-48. "[Ihe English courts held that the author's right of
renewal, although contingent upon his surviving the original fourteen-year period, could be
assigned, and that if he did survive the original term he was bound by the assignment." Id.
56. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709) (Eng.).
mhe author... and his assignee... shall have the sole liberty... of printing...
for the term of one and fourteen years ....
[Alfter the expiration of the said term offourteen years, the sole right of printing or
disposing of copies shall return to the authors thereof if they are then living, for
another term of fourteen years.
Id. (emphasis added).
57. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. The United States Constitution
explicitly gives Congress the power to enact a copyright statute. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "The
Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries... ." Id.
58. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
59. Id.
60. Id. This section states as follows:
[T]he author.., and any other person who hath.. .acquired the copyright... shall
have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending... for
the term of fourteen years ... And if, at the expiration of the said term, the author
... be living... the same exclusive right shall be continued to him or them, his or
their executors, administrators or assigns, for the further term of fourteen years:
Provided, he or they shall cause the title thereof to be a second time recorded and
published in the same manner as is herein after directed, and that within six months
before the expiration of the first term of fourteen years aforesaid.
Id (emphasis added).
61. Id.
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The Copyright Act of 1831, like its predecessors, made the right to the
renewal term contingent upon the author surviving the initial term.62 As
in the Copyright Act of 1790, registration for the renewal term was required
within six months of the expiration of the first term.63 However, the
Copyright Act of 1831 extended the duration of the initial term to twenty-
eight years, while maintaining a fourteen year renewal term." The 1831
Act also contained an important change: it provided for a successor class
to the author, a group which was entitled to claim the renewal interest if the
author did not survive the initial term.65
The Copyright Act of 187066 initiated a significant change that is
crucial to the determination that the copyright renewal term should vest
upon registration with the Copyright Office, in the twenty-eighth year of the
initial term, during the life of the author. The Copyright Act of 1870,
unlike all prior copyright acts, did not expressly require that the author be
living "at the expiration of the aforesaid term of years" in order for the
renewal term to vest.67 The Copyright Act of 1870 simply stated that a
living author has the right to the renewal term, upon registration within six
months before the expiration of the first term.68 In other words, the 1870
62. The Copyright Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 26, § 2, 4 Stat. 436 states:
Mhe author ... and the executors, administrators, or legal assigns of such person
or persons, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and
vending such book or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, or
engraving, in whole or in part, for the term of twenty-eight years ....
Id.
The Act further states:
[11f, at the expiration of the aforesaid term of years, such author,... be living...
or being dead, shall have left a widow, or child, or children, either or all then living,
the same exclusive right shall be continued to such author ... or, if dead, then to
such widow and child, or children,for the further term offourteen years: Provided,
That the title of the work so secured shall be a second time recorded, and all such
other regulations as are herein required in regard to original copyrights, be complied
with in respect to such renewed copyright, and that within six months before the
expiration of the first term.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Copyright Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 88, 16 Stat. 212.
67. Id
68. The Copyright Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 87, 16 Stat. 212 states that "copyrights
shall be granted for the term of twenty-eight years .... " Section 88 of the Act states:
[Tihe author,... if he be still living ... or his widow or children, if he be dead,
shall have the same exclusive right continued for the further term offourteen years,
upon recording the title of the work or description of the article so secured a second
1993]
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Copyright Act omitted the express survivorship requirement contained in
the previous copyright acts. The express survivorship requirement has
never been reinstated in any subsequent copyright act.69 The renewal
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909 are similar to that of the 1870 Act,
with one notable exception: the 1909 Act extended the duration of the
renewal term to twenty-eight years and described a larger class of statutory
successors.7
0
In Frederick Music, the defendant, through an analysis of the history
of the renewal provision, attempted to prove that an author must survive
into the renewal period in order for the renewal term to vest.71 After
examining prior copyright acts, the court rejected the defendant's argument
because, while the Acts of 1790 and 1831 expressly conditioned vesting of
the right to the renewal term upon the author's survival into the renewal
period, the Act of 1870 did not include such a requirement.71 The court
concluded that "[an] analysis of copyright provisions prior to the Act of
1870 is irrelevant, as it is the affirmative renewal concept of that act-not
the language of earlier acts-which is substantially carried forward to the
present law."73
In Marascalco, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also analyzed the
legislative history of the renewal provision and acknowledged that all
time, and complying with all other regulation in regard to original copyrights, within
six months before the expiration of the first term.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075; Copyright Act of October
19, 1976, 17 U.S.C. 304(a) (1976).
70. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075.
Mhe copyright secured by this Act shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date
of first publication .... provided ... the author of such work, if still living, or the
widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such
author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in
the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of
the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly
registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of
copyright: And provided further, That in default of the registration of such
application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall determine at
the expiration of twenty-eight years from first publication.
Id. (emphasis added).
71. Frederick Music, 708 F. Supp. at 589.
72. l at 589-90.
73. Id. at 590. The Marascalco court examined the Frederick Music case and took issue with
the fact that the Frederick Music court rejected the legislative history prior to the 1870 Act as
"irrelevanL" Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 475.
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Copyright Acts prior to 1870 explicitly required that the author survive the
initial term in order for the renewal term to vest.74 In addition, the court
recognized that since, the Act of 1870, all copyright acts have abandoned
this explicit requirement of survivorship. 75 Nevertheless, the court stated
that the better view is that § 304(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act implicitly
reflects the vesting language of earlier statutes that required the author to
survive the initial term in order for the renewal term to vest.76 Although
the 1870 Statute abandoned the express requirement of survivorship, the
court cited several commentators in support of the proposition that
Congress, in enacting the 1870 Act, intended no substantial change to the
renewal provisions of the 1831 Act.*
Without any analysis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon
Nimmer as support for its proposition. Nimmer, a well respected author
in the area of copyright law, states that the most persuasive case authority
supports the view that the renewal term vests upon commencement of the
twenty-ninth year.79 In support of this, Nimmer refers to Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons to bolster the notion that Congress
intended the renewal provisions of the 1909 Act to continue as they
previously existed."0 Nimmer acknowledges that the Copyright Acts of
1790 and 1831 required that the author be living at the expiration of the
initial term in order to be entitled to the renewal term.8 ' After recognizing
that the Act of 1870 discontinued this express requirement of survivorship,
Nimmer states that "[tihere is, however, no indication of an intent to depart
from this requirement as stated in the earlier copyright laws."' 2 Nimmer
concludes that although Congress discontinued the express requirement of
74. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 471-72 (citing the Statute of Anne, the Copyright Act of 1790,
and the Copyright Act of 1831).
75. Id. at 472 (citing the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976).
76. Id at 471.
77. Id. at 472 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9.05[C], at 9-60 (1991); BARBARA A. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT (1960), reprinted in
SEN. JUDICIARY COMM., 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. 107, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY No. 31,
111-12 (1961) (citing De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 576 (1956)); CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2854 (1870) (statement of Mr. Jenckes); 5 LEGISLATivE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT § K, at 77 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds., 1976) (statement of Mr. Hale)
(quoted in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990))).
78. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 472 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 9.05[C], at 9-60 (1991)).
79. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][a], at 9-74.
80. Id (citing generally Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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survivorship contained in the earlier Acts, the 1870 Act and all subsequent
Acts carry forward this requirement because the Fred Fisher Music Court
stated that the renewal provisions of the 1909 Act were a continuation of
prior copyright laws.83
Nimmer's reliance upon the Fred Fisher Music case is misplaced84
As Nimmer points out, the Court in the Fred Fisher Music case said that
the 1909 Act intended the renewal structure to continue as it previously
existed.85 The problem with such reliance is that the Fred Fisher Music
case dealt with the issue of alienability of the renewal term.86 Therefore,
the Supreme Court's opinion with regard to the continuity of previous
copyright law was in reference to alienability, not the proper vesting
date.87 Because the 1870 Act did not depart from the 1831 Act on the
issue of alienability of the renewal term, the Court in Fred Fisher Music
did not even consider the 1870 Act.88 Schrader stated that "any court
proposing to rule on the vesting issue must consider carefully the altered
83. ld. § 9.05[C][1][a], at 9-75.
84. Schrader, supra note 21, at 295-98; Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 477 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
85. NImMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][a], at 9-74.
86. Schrader, supra note 21, at 296-97.
The Court [in Fisher] concluded that the present law embodied the same policy on
alienability of the renewal expectancy as the earlier statutes. Nimmer, while
conceding that the statement in Fisher regarding continuity of renewal policy was not
made with reliance to the vesting issue, nevertheless finds support in the general
comment in Fisher for his view that the requirement of survivorship in the Statute
of Anne, the Act of 1790, and the Act of 1831 continues in the present law.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Marascalco court also examined this issue:
The Fisher court based its conclusion on an extensive analysis of the statutory
history leading up to the 1909 Act. In particular, the Court relied heavily on
language of a House Committee Report stating that the law should be framed "as is
the existing law." This analysis, however, was undertaken for the sole purpose of
determining whether an author may assign his renewal expectancy. As a result, the
Court did not consider the Act of 1870. It did not need to consider that Act because
there was no departure in it from the Act of 1831 on the issue of assignability of the
renewal expectancy. Thus, the Court never considered Congress' deletion of
language requiring survival until commencement of the renewal term. As the
Supreme Court made clear in Stewart v. Abend, Fisher was silent concerning the time
of vesting.
Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 477 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
87. Schrader, supra note 21, at 297. "As Nimmer concedes, the Fisher Court made no direct
comment on the vesting issue with respect to the present law." Id.
88. Id.
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language of the Act of 1870, which dropped the reference to survival of the
author to the expiration of the first term.
89
Thus, the Marascalco court incorrectly relied upon Nimmer as support
for the notion that the renewal term should vest upon commencement of the
twenty-ninth year. Nimmer's theory depends on Fred Fisher Music, a case
which considered the issue of alienability and did not analyze the Copyright
Act of 1870. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that "[n]either Miller Music nor Fred Fisher decided the question of
when the renewal rights vest .... ."'
The Marascalco court cited a passage from an article authored by
Barbara A. Ringer, a former Register of Copyrights, as support for the
notion that the Copyright Act of 1870 retained the same renewal provisions
of prior Copyright Acts.91 In her article, Ringer makes the following
sweeping statement: "[I]n the next revision of the U.S. copyright law in
1870, the renewal provisions of the Act of 1831 were retained without
substantial change, and in the fragmentary history there is no indication that
any change was considered or even suggested."' Ringer's statement fails
to support the notion that Congress did not intend the 1870 Act to change
the renewal provisions. Ringer's statement is a single sentence analysis of
the 1870 Act that includes no discussion of the deletion of the survivorship
requirement.93 Additionally, as the majority concedes, Ringer ultimately
concludes that the renewal term vests upon registration.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon a statement made in
the legislative history as support for the notion that the creators of the 1870
89. Id.
90. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 n.2 (1990).
91. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 472 (citing BARBARA A. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT
(1960), reprinted in SEN. JUDICIARY COMM., 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. 107, COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION STUDY No. 31, 111-12 (1961)).
92. BARBARA A. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT (1960), reprinted in SEN. JUDICIARY
COMM., 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. 107, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY No. 31, 111-12 (1961).
93. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 477 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 473, 477 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Ms. Ringer stated in part as follows:
(3) As soon as a valid renewal claim is registered, the renewal is "vested in
interest"f-that is, there is a "present fixed right of future enjoyment."
(a) At this point the rights of the group entitled to claim are determined and
indefeasible, and the contingent rights of the other statutory classes are cut off and
destroyed. The death, during the renewal year, of the registered claimant or of any
other entitled to claim, will not affect the validity of the renewal, the rights of the
other members of the class, the rights of assignees, or the rights of his own heir or
legatees.
Ringer, supra note 92, at 186.
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Act did not intend any change from previous Acts.95 According to the
legislative history of the 1909 Act, 'The right of renewal is contingent. It
does not vest until the end [of the original term]. If [the author] is alive at
the time of renewal, then the original contract may pass it, but his widow
or children would not be bound by that contract."96
This quote represents very limited authority for the proposition that
the creators of the 1870 Act intended no substantial change. Mr. Hale is
a publisher who made the above statement before a joint Senate and House
committee which was analyzing several proposals for revising the
Copyright Act. 7 The committee heard no discussion regarding the vesting
date of renewal rights.98 Additionally, this passage is misleading. The
bracketed language, "of the original term," was added by the Supreme
Court in Stewart v. Abend.99 The actual quote reads as follows: "The
right of renewal is contingent. It does not vest until the end."'" The
word "end" was never defined by Mr. Hale. Therefore, this quote has little
value when it is read in context.101
The Marascalco court also cited the following statement from the
legislative history of the 1870 Act to support its claim that this Act
preserved the renewal provisions as they had previously existed: 'The
committee... [has] carefully preserved every existing right [contained in
extant copyright law] ... ."" However, this legislative history has
limited value because it did not include any discussion of the renewal
provisions or of the deletion of the survivorship requirement.0" There-
fore, even if the legislative history of the renewal provisions was analyzed
in order to help understand the intent of § 304(a), no persuasive authority
is found to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.
95. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 473.
96. Id. (citing 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT § K, at 77 (E.
Brylawski & A. Goldman eds., 1976) (statement of Mr. Hale) (quoted in Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (bracketed material included)).
97. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 477 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. IM (citing 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT § K, at 77 (E.
Brylawski & A. Goldman eds., 1976) (statement of Mr. Hale) (quoted in Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (bracketed material included)).
100. 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT § K, at 77 (E. Brylawski & A.
Goldman eds., 1976) (statement of Mr. Hale).
101. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 477 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 472 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2854 (1870) (statement of Mr.
Jenckes) (alteration in original)).
103. Schrader, supra note 21, at 280 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2679-83,
2854-58, 2872-80, 4819-27 (1870)).
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B. Case Law Analysis of the Renewal Provisions
Prior to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992
Many courts, in dicta, have discussed the proper vesting date of the
renewal term." The language of virtually every court implies that if the
issue of the proper vesting date were before it, the court would hold that
the renewal term of copyright should vest upon registration with the
Copyright Office, in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term, during the
life of the author. In Frederick Music, the court discussed and cited dicta
from many cases supporting the view that the renewal term should vest
upon registration. 5 In Marascalco, the court discussed the dicta of
several of the United States Supreme Court decisions but disregarded most
of the lower court decisions.10 6
1. Early Cases Interpreting the Renewal
Provisions of the 1909 Copyright Act
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff,"7 a music publisher,
claiming that it had a vested right, attempted to register for the renewal
term of copyright. The court affirmed the decision for the respondents and
held that only the author, his family, or his executors could ordinarily apply
for an extension."0 8 Although this case is one of the first involving the
renewal provisions of the 1909 Copyright Act, the court indicated that the
right to the renewal term vests in the twenty-eighth year. The court stated,
in part, "[I]n connection with the renewal, the persons who control the right
thereto, whether widow, widower, or the author himself, may, during the
104. See generally Schrader, supra note 21, at 284-94.
105. Frederick Music, 708 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Miller Music Corp v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960); Miller Music Corp v. Charles N. Daniels,
Inc., 158 F. Supp. 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir.
1943); Picture Music v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 457 F.2d
1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Davis v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240
F. Supp. 612, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253,
257 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Tobias v. Joy Music, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rose v.
Bourne, 176 F. Supp. 605, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 880 (1960); Carmichael v. Mills Music, 121 F. Supp. 43, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 33 N.Y.S.2d 294,296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942), arid on other grounds,
289 N.Y. 727 (1942); Capano Music, Div. of Britone v. Myers Music, 605 F. Supp. 692, 695
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
106. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 474.
107. 187 F. 247, 247-48 (1st Cir. 1911).
108. Id. at 249.
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year prior to the expiration of the existing term nominated in section 24,
assign the right to renewal, so that the then proprietor may make the new
registration required, and take out the extension in his own name."'"
This passage indicates the court's belief that renewal rights vest during the
twenty-eighth year. The court did not imply that such right was contingent
upon the author surviving the twenty-eighth year.
In Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp.,"' the plaintiff held the rights
to the renewal term of copyright in the novel "At the Mercy of Tiberius"
as assignee of the next of kin of the author. The defendant threatened to
produce a photoplay based on the underlying work.' The court reversed
the district court's denial of an injunction against the defendant."'
In its analysis, the court indicated that it interprets the vesting date of
the renewal term to be upon registration in the twenty-eighth year. The
court stated: "If, however, the author lives to within the statutory year, he
may certainly exercise his [renewal] right, assign it, or bequeath it; and if
he dies in the year, but before registration, it is for his executors to
function."
'" 3
In Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc.," 4 the wife of a composer assigned
her renewal rights to a publisher for consideration of $5,000 to be paid
within thirty days after the composer's death. The wife predeceased her
husband and the representatives of the estate sought to recover the
$5,000."' The publisher argued that the contract should be read as only
requiring payment of the $5,000 if the composer predeceased his wife." 6
The court ruled in the estate's favor, holding that the contract did not
contain an implied condition of survivorship."' In its opinion, the court
analyzed the Copyright Act and concluded that the renewal term should
vest upon registration." 8 The court stated:
The right of renewal is dependent upon whether the composition
belonged to and was published by an employer or the author
.... If in the author, the right to renew accrues upon applica-
tion during the last year of the original term, and is limited to
109. Id.
110. 273 F. 909, 910 (2d Cir. 1921).
Il1. Id
112. Id at 914-15.
113. Id at 913.
114. 33 N.Y.S.2d 294, 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942).
115. Id at 295.
116. Id at 297.
117. Id at 298.
118. Id at 296.
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those enumerated in the Act, including the author, and in the
event of his death, the widow, despite any attempted assignment
by the author during the original term of copyright.
1 9
It seems clear that this court would find that the renewal term of copyright
should vest upon registration in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term
because the court made no mention of a survivorship requirement.
The case of Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.1 ° involved a
copyright infringement claim of seven songs. The second cause of action
involved a dispute over the right to the renewal term in the song "I Want
a Girl Just Like the Girl Who Married Dear Old Dad."'' Dillon, the
lyricist, assigned his interest in the renewal term to the plaintiff and
subsequently made a similar assignment to the defendant." The court
held as follows:
Since Dillon was living on the first day of the twenty-eighth year
of the original term, the 1911 assignment by him to the plaintiff
corporation vested in it all his renewal rights and gave it the
exclusive right to publish the song not only during the original
term but also during the renewed term."
The language used by this court indicates that the renewal term vested
in the plaintiff by virtue of the prior assignment, in the twenty-eighth year
of the initial term. The court made no mention of a further survivorship
requirement.
2. United States Supreme Court Cases Interpreting
the Renewal Provisions of the 1909 Copyright Act
In Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 24 the Supreme
Court analyzed the 1909 Copyright Act and held that authors may assign
their interest in the renewal term of copyright. While explaining the issue
in this case, the Court defined § 24 of the 1909 Copyright Act."z The
following definition implies that if the question were before the Supreme
119. Tobani, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (emphasis added).
120. 53 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
121. Id. at 194.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943). The copyrighted work in conflict was the song "When Irish
Eyes Are Smiling." Id. at 645.
125. Id. at 643-44.
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Court, it would hold that the renewal term should vest upon registration in
the twenty-eighth year, during the life of the author. The Court stated:
Under § [24] of the Copyright Act of 1909 ... a copyright in a
musical composition lasts for twenty-eight years from the date of
its first publication, and the author can renew the copyright, if he
is still living, for a further term of twenty-eight years by filing an
application for renewal within a year before the expiration of the
first twenty-eight year period. "
This definition expresses the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
requirements for securing the renewal term. Had the Court believed that
there was an additional requirement of survivorship into the twenty-ninth
year, its discussion would have certainly included this additional element.
Based upon this definition and the lack of any language implying that this
entire process is only contingent upon survival into the twenty-ninth year,
the Supreme Court would apparently support the premise that the renewal
term vests upon registration with the Copyright Office, in the twenty-eighth
year of the initial term, during the life of the author.
In Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.,127 the author of
the song "Moonlight and Roses" died prior to the twenty-eighth year of the
initial term. The case involved a conflict between the author's assignee of
the renewal term and the executor of the author's estate, each claiming the
right to the renewal term." 8 The Supreme Court held that the renewal
rights accrued to the executor of the estate rather than the assignee.129 In
its discussion, the Court made the following statement, which has been
interpreted and discussed by many courts and commentators: "An assign-
ment by an author of his renewal rights made before the original copyright
expires is valid against the world, if the author is alive at the commence-
ment of the renewal period."
130
Because the Court did not define "renewal period," the above
statement does not decisively resolve the question of when the renewal term
should vest. The Court may have intended "renewal period" to mean the
first day that the author could register for renewal, i.e., the first day of the
twenty-eighth year. Conversely, the court may have intended "renewal
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. 362 U.S. 373, 374 (1960).
128. Id
129. Id. at 377-78.
130. Id. at 375. The interpretation of "renewal period" is discussed throughout this Article.
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period" to mean the first day of the actual renewal term, i.e., the first day
of the twenty-ninth year."'
3. Subsequent Cases Interpreting the Renewal
Provisions of the 1909 Copyright Act
In Rossiter v. Vogel,' the plaintiff, the prior assignee of the renewal
term of copyright in the song "Some of These Days," sought a judgment
ordering defendant, the subsequent assignee of the renewal term, to transfer
the renewal to him and to enjoin defendants from further use. The court
reversed and remanded the summary judgment granted in the plaintiffs
favor because it found issues of fraud and inadequate consideration.
13
In its discussion, the court stated that "[t]he renewal right does not strictly
accrue until the filing of an application in the twenty-eighth year of the
original term, and the renewal itself does not thereafter become effective
until the first day of the twenty-ninth year.' ' "
Although this wording is ambiguous, the court indicates that the right
to renew accrues upon registration in the twenty-eighth year, and this right
is not effective until the twenty-ninth year.'35 Therefore, this statement
can simply be interpreted to mean that the renewal term vests in the owner
upon registration, but he or she obviously may not exercise such rights until
the renewal period begins-the first day of the twenty-ninth year.
36
131. As will be discussed, most courts and commentators have interpreted "renewal period"
to refer to the period during the twenty-eighth year. Nimmer interprets "renewal period" to
signify the second term of copyright. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][a], at 9-74. In
Marascalco, the court discussed the Miller Music "renewal period" and acknowledged that there
has been much disagreement over its meaning. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 474.
132. 134 F.2d 908, 910 (2d Cir. 1943).
133. Id. at 912. Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the district judge's decision that the
plaintiff's assignment was unenforceable based upon lack of consideration. Rossiter v. Vogel, 148
F.2d 292, 292-94 (2d Cir. 1945).
134. Rossiter, 134 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1943).
135. Id.
136. See Schrader, supra note 21, at 293.
The meaning of this passage is not completely free from doubt, but the most likely
interpretation is that the comments support vesting of the renewal interest by the act
of registration. The Court clearly emphasized the significance of the registration act,
and seemed to say that the renewal vests in interest on that date and is reduced to
possession on the first day of the 29th year after publication. Thus use of the phrase
"renewal right" is somewhat unfortunate since this phrase is so close to the phrase
"right of renewal." The latter definitely refers to the right to apply for renewal
registration. Obviously, the Court means something other than the right to apply
when it uses the phrase "renewal right" because it says the "renewal right" accrues
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In Carmichael v. Mills Music, 37 the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment regarding the right to the renewal term of fourteen songs. The
court considered whether ajusticiable controversy existed with regard to the
songs that were still in the initial term of copyright. 31 The court held
that there was a justiciable controversy. 139 The court discussed § 24 of
the 1909 Copyright Act and stated as follows:
[I]f the author is not living at a time one year prior to the expira-
tion of the original term of copyright, then designated successors
are entitled to the renewal, and an assignment of a renewal
expectancy rests upon the author's survival until the time of the
accrual of renewal rights.Y
It is probable that "accrual of renewal rights" refers to the twenty-eighth
year because this court does not seem to require that the author survive the
initial term.
In Rose v. Bourne, Inc.,41 two composers and the executor of a
deceased composer brought suit against a publisher regarding the right to
the renewal term in the song 'That Old Gang of Mine." The district court
held and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the publisher
had the right to the renewal term because the composers had effectively
assigned the song for the initial and "renewal terms. 42 In this case, the
district court appears to have expressed its belief that the renewal term vests
upon registration. The district court stated that "[u]nless defective under
the special rule as to expectancies.... the title of the assignee is complete
and perfect at the instant the application in the name of the author is
registered."''" In addition, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpret-
ed the Miller Music "renewal period."'" The court referred to the Miller
Music "renewal period" and then stated that "[i]n this case, the renewal
period began on [the first day of the twenty-eighth year] .... ""
upon filing of an application. Consequently, "renewal righf' seems to mean the
renewal interest, and this "accrues" or vests upon filing of a valid application during
the 28th year of the original term.
Id. (emphasis in original).
137. 121 F. Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
138. Id at 45.
139. Id. at 46.
140. Id. at 45.
141. 176 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aft'd, 279 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 610.
144. Rose v. Bourne, Inc., 279 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles
N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960)).
145. ld. at 80. See also Schrader, supra note 21, at 285.
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The Second Circuit supported the lower court's belief that the renewal
term should vest upon registration when it said, "[t]herefore we affirm
Judge Dimock's conclusion that appellee, having made a timely filing for
renewal, is the present legal owner of the renewal copyright."'" Taken
as a whole, both Rose decisions favor the idea that the renewal term should
vest upon registration with the Copyright Office.
In Tobias v. Joy Music, Inc.,47 the plaintiffs, authors of the song
"Miss You," brought an action to determine the ownership of the renewal
term of copyright. The defendant claimed the right to the renewal term as
successor in interest of a 1929 assignment."4 The court held that the
1929 instrument was a valid assignment and that the defendant was the sole
owner of the renewal term.'49
The Tobias court demonstrated its support for the notion that the right
to the renewal term vests upon registration in the twenty-eighth year during
the life of the author. In its discussion, the court made reference to the
Miller Music "renewal period"'5° and then stated that "[h]ere, the renewal
period began on [the first day of the twenty-eighth year]; and since it is
apparent that all three authors were alive on that date, the right to renewal
thereupon vested in the assignee under the terms of the contract.",'15 The
court did not indicate that the entire process of vesting the renewal term
was also contingent upon survivorship.
In Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp.,52 a composer, his
widow, and daughters assigned to the publisher their renewal expectancies.
The two daughters alleged that the assignments were void because their
father had conspired with the publisher to obtain their assignments.1
3
Further, the daughters claimed that through this conspiracy, the father
persuaded them to execute the assignments by false and fraudulent
misrepresentations." 4 The court held that there was no basis for federal
jurisdiction and that the state courts were the appropriate venue for such
questions. 55 The Cresci court favored the view that the proper vesting
146. Rose, 279 F.2d at 81.
147. 204 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
148. Id. at 557.
149. Id.
150. Miller Music, 362 U.S. at 375.
151. Tobias, 204 F. Supp. at 559.
152. 210 F. Supp. 253, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The case involves a conflict over 65
copyrighted songs. Id
153. Id. at 255
154. I&
155. Id at 260.
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date of the renewal term is upon registration. 56  In its discussion, the
court asserted that "[t]he renewal right does not accrue until the filing of
an application in the twenty-eighth year of the original term."'57
This court also interpreted Miller Music,158 and stated:
It is plain that it was the intention of Congress in enacting [§ 24]
to provide that the renewal rights of a copyrighted work would
inure to the benefit of the author if living at the time when
application for renewal could be made, and, if not, to his widow
or children or the other persons designated in the statute in the
appropriate order of succession.'59
The court also had the opportunity to comment on the precise issue at
hand."6  The daughters questioned whether the assignee lost the right to
the renewal term with respect to eleven of the sixty songs, where the author
died in the twenty-eighth year but after registration.' 6' Although the
court did not decide this issue, it referred to Rose v. Bourne, Inc.62 and
stated that "[t]he point is of very doubtful merit in the light of the language
of § 28.""163 If the issue were before this court, it appears that the court
would find that the renewal term of copyright should vest upon registration
156. Id. at 258. See also Schrader, supra note 21, at 285.
157. Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
158. 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
159. Cresci, 210 F. Supp. at 258 (emphasis added).
160. i at 259.
161. Id The court stated as follows:
Finally, plaintiffs seek to invoke jurisdiction under § 1338(a) because it appears from
the answer to the amended complaint (though not from the amended complaint itself)
that, as to 11 of the more than 60 compositions involved here, [the father] had died
during the 28th year of the original term, after the application for renewal had been
filed but before the commencement of the renewal term itself on the first day of the
29th year. This, say the plaintiffs, raises the question of whether under the copyright
laws, a composer's assignee loses its right to the renewed copyright if the composer
dies after an application for renewal under the assignment from the composer is filed
during the twenty-eighth year but before the renewal term actually commences.
Plaintiffs claim that this question has never been decided and was left open
both by Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., supra, where the author died
before the commencement of the twenty-eighth year, and by Fred Fisher Music Co.
v. M. Witmark & Sons, supra, where the author was alive at the commencement of
the twenty-ninth year when the renewal term commenced.
Ia
162. 176 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aft'd, 279 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
163. Cresci, 210 F. Supp. at 259. Section 28 states, "[clopyright secured under this title or
previous copyright laws of the United States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an
instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright, or may be bequeathed by will."
17 U.S.C. § 28 (1909).
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with the Copyright Office, in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term,
during the life of the author.
Davis v. DuPont de Nemours & Co."6 involved a complex copyright
infringement suit. The plaintiff claimed that his copyrighted dramatization
of Edith Wharton's novel "Ethan Frome," originally produced on Broad-
way, was infringed by a television version sponsored, televised, produced,
and written by various defendants."65 The court held that all of the
defendants were liable for copyright infringement.1" In its discussion,
the court made the following statement:
It is settled that an author's renewal right to his copyrighted work
is a mere expectancy and that an assignee of the copyright and
the renewal rights retains no interest beyond the initial period of
copyright if the author is not alive at the beginning of the renewal
period-i.e., the last year of the initial copyright term. 67
This statement represents strong support for the contention that the proper
vesting date for the renewal term is in the twenty-eighth year. Additional-
ly, a citation to Miller Music68 and Rose169 followed this statement.
Such reference further bolsters the notion that the Miller Music "renewal
period"7 pertains to the twenty-eighth year, not the twenty-ninth year.
In Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.," the plaintiff claimed, as an
assignee of the alleged co-author, a one-half ownership interest in the
renewal term of copyright in the song "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad
Wolf." The defendant claimed to own the right to the entire renewal
copyright.72 The court found for the defendant, holding that there was
no merit in the plaintiff's claim of joint ownership and, therefore, that the
plaintiff had no rights to the renewal term.' In its discussion, this court
also clearly said that the author need only live into the twenty-eighth year,
not the twenty-ninth year, for the renewal term to vest.'74 The court
stated that "[i]f the author lives into the 28th year of the original period, the
renewal copyright, a distinct and separate estate from the original term,
164. 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
165. Il at 614-15.
166. Id. at 629-30, 632.
167. Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
168. Miller Music, 362 U.S. at 375.
169. Rose, 176 F. Supp. at 605.
170. Miller Music, 362 U.S. at 375.
171. 314 F. Supp. 640, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
172. Il
173. Il at 653.
174. Id. at 644.
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vests in him. He may, of course, dispose of the renewal by contract before
or after the renewal term commences."' 75
4. Judicial Dicta Which Supports Vesting Upon
Commencement of the Renewal Term
One case has stated in dicta that the renewal term vests upon com-
mencement of the twenty-ninth year. In Arlen v. Commissioner,76 a
composer and his wife received a $50,000 loan from a music publisher as
consideration for their assignment of renewal rights in forty-six musical
compositions. The composer and his wife claimed that the $50,000 was
borrowed money and, thus, not taxable income."7  The Commissioner
contended that this loan was a royalty advance and taxable as ordinary
income. 7' The court held that the $50,000 received was a loan and not
a "sham."'7 9  The court interpreted "renewal period" to be that period
beginning in the twenty-ninth year.' The court stated:
An assignment by an author of the renewal rights to a copyright
made before the original copyright expires is valid against the
world if the author is alive at the commencement of the renewal
period. Likewise, each member of the successor class must
survive the expiration of the original term in order to obtain a
vested interest in the renewal copyright term. Any attempted
assignment by any one of the class who fails to survive the
expiration of the original term of the copyright is void.'
This case affords very limited authority for the proposition that the
renewal term of copyright should vest in the twenty-ninth year for the
following reasons: (1) the vesting date of the renewal term of the copyright
was not at issue in this case; rather, the court analyzed the Copyright Act
175. Id
176. 48 T.C. 640, 644 (1967).
177. Id
178. Id at 644-45. Although notes were given for the $50,000 loan, the Commissioner
claimed the $50,000 paid "was intended as advance royalties and that the giving of the notes was
unrealistic and a sham." Id
179. Id at 648-49. The court stated that, "[t]he notes in the instant case were negotiable,
unconditional, could have been discounted by the payee at any time, and were issued for a
business purpose." Id
180. Id at 646.
181. Arlen, 48 T.C. 640, 646 (1967) (citing generally Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark
& Sons 318 U.S. 643 (1943); DeSylva v. Ballentine 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960)).
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solely to establish a valid business purpose to make the loan, i.e., that due
consideration was being paid because the renewal term was a contingent
interest; (2) the case was decided by the Tax Court which is not well
versed in the intricacies of the Copyright Act; and (3) the court only
analyzed the United States Supreme Court renewal cases and did not
address any of the lower court decisions that have since interpreted these
cases.
183
The Arlen case was considered by the Frederick Music Court as
authority after it determined that "[t]he issue of when renewal rights vest
was irrelevant to that decision, and the case involved tax, not copyright
considerations."'" The court in Marascalco also disregarded the
persuasiveness of the Arlen decision. 5
C. Coimnentators' Opinions
The issue of the proper vesting date of the renewal term has also been
a topic of discussion among commentators. While Nimmer takes the
position that the renewal term vests upon commencement of the twenty-
ninth year,'86 the majority of commentators contend that the proper
vesting date is upon registration with the Copyright Office, in the twenty-
eighth year of the initial term, during the life of the author."s Nimmer
182. IL at 647. The court stated: 'Thus, there was a very real and valid business purpose
for making the advance of $50,000 to petitioner in the form of a loan evidenced by negotiable,
unconditional promissory notes." Id See also Schrader, supra note 21, at 287.
183. Arlen, 48 T.C. at 644 (citing generally Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,
318 U.S. 643 (1943); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Miller Music Corp. v. Charles
N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960)). As explained in this Article, the lower courts have
generally interpreted the Miller Music "renewal period" to mean that the renewal term should vest
upon registration in the twenty-eighth year. See also Schrader, supra note 21, at 287.
184. Frederick Music, 708 F. Supp. 587,591 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Arlen v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 640 (1967)).
185. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 475. "Arlen was decided by a court whose area of special
expertise is tax, not copyright, law. Further, Arlen reached its conclusion without any discussion
of whether another competing interpretation of 'renewal period' might exist." Id.
186. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][a], at 9-74.
187. 1 PAUL GOLDSTmE, COPYRIGHT PRICIwLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.8.1, at 451 (1989)
('The plain language of section 304(a) suggests that vesting occurs on the date the renewal is
registered .... Although no judicial decision is precisely on point, dicta in several cases decided
under the 1909 Act support this conclusion"); April V. Rayner, Copyright Succession: Traps
Lurking in the Renewal System, L.A. DAILY J., June 10, 1988, at 6 ("mhe registration date
receives the most support by both courts and commentators .... Therefore, this author
recommends that the courts adopt the date of renewal registration as the vesting date."); ALAN
LATmAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRiGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 AcT 75
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claims that because the Miller Music reference to "renewal period" cites
Fred Fisher Music, it indicates "that the Court in Miller used the phrase
'renewal period' as synonymous with the renewal term of copyright."18
Schrader cites Miller Music and the lower court cases interpreting
Miller Music as support for her contention that the renewal term should
vest upon registration.189 Schrader also points to the lower court decision
(5th ed. 1979) ('There is nothing in the statute to imply that the renewal claimant must live out
the year before such new copyright becomes vested in his assignee."); CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH
INsTnuT, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IssUES 123 (1973)
("In the first period, protection lasts for 28 years; then, during the 28th year, this protection may
be extended for 28 more years, if the renewal is applied for by one of the persons specified in
the statute."); Schrader, supra note 21, at 287 ('This article takes the position that the renewal
interest vests upon timely application to the Copyright Office by the proper statutory claimant.");
BARBARA A. RINGER & PAUL GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS 62 (rev. ed. 1965) ("If the assignor is living
during the twenty-eighth year of the copyright, the assignee may file a renewal application in the
assignor's name and thereby secure effective ownership of the renewal copyright."); COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, chap. V, at 51 (Comm. Print 1961)
("Copyright expires after the initial term of 28 years, unless it is renewed during the last year of
that term."); Ringer, supra note 92, at 186 ("As soon as a valid renewal claim is registered, the
renewal is 'vested in interest'-that is, there is a 'present fixed right of future enjoyment'.");
Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23,26 (1955) ("It
would seem that under the present law the date of application is the crucial date. If a timely
application is made, the death of the applicant prior to the beginning of the renewal term will not
defeat the rights of his heirs, legatees or assigns."); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright: 1, 45 COLuM. L. REV. 503, 527 (1945) ("If a childless author applies for renewal
during the twenty-eighth year, and then dies before its end, can his widow get the renewal as
against his assignee? Probably not, on the ground that the author's right vests on his
application."); Theodore R. Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright-Section 23 of the Copyright Act
of 1909, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 712, 733 (1944) ("lIt would seem that survival until the end of the
basic term is unnecessary and that, once vested, the renewal term cannot be divested by the death
of the applicant."); Sidney J. Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, CORNELL L.Q. 459, 473
('Frolich and Schwartz in their treatise suggest that if the author makes an assignment during the
last year of the first term and then dies, the assignee and not the persons enumerated in the statute
would get the new term. It is submitted that this would not be so unless the author or his
assignee in the author's name had already obtained the renewal at the time of the assignment.").
188. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][a], at 9-75. Nimmer states the following as support
for his conclusion:
This for the reason that the Fisher opinion repeatedly points to renewal provisions
of the Acts of 1790 and 1831 requiring survivorship to the "expiration" of the
original term of copyright, and then concludes (although not with specific reference
to this point) that the renewal provision under the 1909 Act was not intended to
constitute a substantive departure from earlier law.
Id.
189. Schrader, supra note 21, at 300-01.
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in Miller Music to support her view that the Supreme Court intended
"renewal period" to mean the period during the twenty-eighth year.
19
0
In the light of the policy of the act with respect to renewal right,
"expectancy" means that any right to renewal which the author
may have is entirely contingent upon the author's survival until
the commencement of the twenty-eighth year. Since this is so, an
author's assignment of his renewal rights in futuro can effectively
transfer such rights to the assignee only if the author survives
until the commencement of the twenty-eighth, or last, year of the
original term. If the author survives he becomes vested with an
absolute power to renew under the statute, and the prior contin-
gent assignment in turn vests such renewal rights in the assign-
ee
191
Therefore, in affirming the Miller Music decision, the Supreme Court most
likely intended the reference to "renewal period" to mean the period of time
during the twenty-eighth year."9
Schrader's position that the renewal term should vest upon registration
is based upon "the significance of the registration act under Section 24, the
apparent support of Miller v. Daniels, and the clear support in the dicta of
most copyright cases touching on the vesting issue."193 Schrader supports
her conclusion by acknowledging that the 1870 Act deleted the express
requirement of survivorship contained in the previous copyright acts."9
Because there is no legislative history addressing this language change,
Schrader suggests that there was an inconsistency between the apparent
requirement of survivorship "when coupled with" the requirement of
190. Id (citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 188, 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
191. Id (citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 188, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (emphasis added)).
192. Id.
193. Id at 298 (emphasis omitted).
194. Schrader, supra note 21, at 283-84.
Arguably, the deletion of this phrase was a deliberate act by Congress to remove any
question about the significance of survivorship after the statutory formalities have
been complied with. Unfortunately, no committee report was printed, and the debate
in Congress did not include any discussion of the renewal provision, let alone
discussion of the reason for deletion of the reference to survivorship to the expiration
of the original term.
Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2679-83, 2854-58, 2872-80,4819-27 (1870)). But
see Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 472 (citing a section of these Congressional debates in support of
its conclusion that Congress intended no substantial change to the renewal provisions of the 1831
Act).
1993]
466 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
fulfilling the statutory formalities before the expiration of the original
term.195 Therefore, the drafters may have "decided to remove even the
implied 'requirement' of survivorship and clearly... permit the renewal
interest to vest upon compliance with the requisite formalities."1"
D. Policy Arguments
1. Fairness
The vesting date of the renewal term is important because it will
determine further rights to a copyright as between the author, his or her
assignee, and his or her statutory successors. The "vesting upon registra-
tion" view is the fairest interpretation of § 304(a) because the rights of all
of these parties will be determined on this date."9 If the "vesting upon
commencement of the renewal period" view were followed, the rights of
the interested parties would be uncertain during the period between
registration and the beginning of the twenty-ninth year. Congress probably
did not intend such an impractical alternative. 98
The main purpose of the two-term copyright durational scheme is to
benefit the author.' Upon the author's death, any such benefit passes
to the statutory successor.' At first glance, it appears that the later the
vesting date of the renewal term, the greater the chance that the statutory
successor will be able to obtain the right to the renewal term. However,
because the copyright will be lost to the public domain if the statutory
successor does not renew, this is not always the case.
195. Schrader, supra note 21, at 284.
196. Id.
197. Kupferman, supra note 187, at 733-34.
198. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 187, § 4.8.1, at 451-52.
199. Ringer, supra note 92, at 111-12 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1909)).
It was urged before the committee that it would be better to have a single term
without any right of renewal, and a term of life and fifty years was suggested. Your
committee, after full consideration, decided that it was distinctly to the advantage of
the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author
sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work
proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your
committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal
term, and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be
deprived of that right.
Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
200. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
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Statutory successors may not renew for the following reasons: they
are unaware of their status as statutory successors of a copyright, they are
unaware that there is a renewal requirement, or they may not think about
renewing the copyright while mourning the death of the author. A most
alarming problem may occur if the "vesting upon the twenty-ninth year"
approach is followed. Suppose the author registers for his renewal term
and then dies on the last day of the twenty-eighth year. If this were to
occur, the statutory successor obviously would not have time to register for
the renewal term before the end of the twenty-eighth year and the work
would fall into the public domain.2" Many commentators have cited this
sequence of events as one of their reasons for supporting the "vesting upon
registration" view.' If the renewal term were to vest upon registration,
renewed copyrights would not accidentally fall into the public domain.
Therefore, the act of registration, which extends the copyright for a
second twenty-eight year term should also vest the renewal interest so that
legal relationships and rights of all parties will be determined and there will
be no risk that a renewed copyright will fall into the public domain.' 3
In Marascalco, the court considered these policy arguments. While
conceding that these are serious concerns, the court determined that "they
are not enough to disturb the reading that best comports with statutory
intent.
' '24
2. Copyright Law Must Also Protect Publishers
The primary purpose of copyright is to benefit the author. 5 The
monopoly created by copyright gives the author the opportunity for great
financial gain. In reality, it is often the publisher who owns the copyright
and pays royalties to the author.2°  The result is that the author is
indirectly benefited by the ability to assign the copyright to the publish-
er.' 7 Because the publisher is necessary for the author to achieve
201. Schrader, supra note 21, at 299-300 (citing 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 162 (1910)). This is
likely because the Copyright Office only enters renewal claims on behalf of the proper statutory
claimant. Therefore, the renewal must be made in the author's name and registration cannot be
made in all possible future claimants to avoid this situation from occurring. l at 300.
202. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 187, § 4.8.1, at 452; Rayner, supra note 187, at 6; Schrader,
supra note 21, at 299; Kupferman, supra note 187, at 733-34.
203. Schrader, supra note 21, at 298-99.
204. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 476.
205. Chafee, supra note 187, at 506.
206. Id. at 508.
207. Id. at 509.
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success, the publisher must also benefit from the copyright.2°  Therefore,
the publisher's interest must also be considered when creating and
interpreting copyright laws.' Although the publisher reaps large benefits
from best-selling works, they also lose a great deal of money on unsuccess-
ful material.2" Allowing the renewal term to vest upon registration
furthers the publisher's interest. In providing an earlier vesting date, the
publisher will be vested with more renewal terms, and is provided with a
single date which finalizes the rights of all interested parties.1
Hm. WHEN DOES THE RENEWAL TERM VEST:
AFrER THE COPYRIGHT RENEWAL Acr OF 1992
A. Statutory Construction
In 1992, President George Bush signed into law the Copyright
Amendments Act of 1992.212 Title I of this Act is referred to as the
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992.21' The main purpose of the Copyright
Renewal Act of 1992 is to provide a system of automatic renewal of copy-
208. Id
[lit does cost a good deal to print a book and to attract buyers. Even if an author
could afford to publish his own book, he would not do the job well. And if the
publishers did not get the benefit of the copyright monopoly, it would be hard for an
author to find a publisher to bring out the book. Once the book was launched and
became a success, any authorized competitor would eagerly jump into the market
because his advertising would be low. He could reap where he had not sown. Both
authors and readers would be helpless without publishers.
Id.
209. Id.
210. Chafee, supra note 187, at 509.
No doubt the return to a publisher from a particular book which becomes a bestseller
may be far above the customary six percent. But we mustn't concentrate our gaze
on this one book. Publishing is close to gambling. Many of the same publisher's
books never pay back his original outlay. Only an occasional killing makes it
possible for us to read a number of less popular but perhaps more valuable books.
If we look at the rate of return on all books published by any firm, it does not seem
excessive. Few publishers become millionaires. Thus copyright is necessary to make
good publishers possible.
Id at 509-10 (emphasis omitted).
211. This analysis applies to publishers and producers of all art forms, including music and
film.
212. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
213. Id
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rights.214 This legislation effectively resolves the dispute as to the proper
vesting date of the renewal term for the relevant copyrights.
As previously explained, the renewal provisions of the 1976 Copyright
Act contain areas of ambiguity which have resulted in conflicting court
interpretations. In fact, Senate and House Reports considering the
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 both referred to the 1976 Copyright Act
renewal provision as "one of the worst features of the present copyright
law" with "unclear and highly technical requirement[s]" and "the cause of
inadvertent and unjust loss of copyright." '215 Therefore, the Copyright
Renewal Act of 1992 eradicates the problems associated with determining
when the renewal term vests and, thus, provides a more definite method for
determining the proper owner of the renewal term of copyright.
1. The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992
The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, which prospectively became
effective on June 26, 1992, only applies to copyrights secured during the
fourteen year period between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977.216
A copyright secured after December 31, 1977, has a single term of
copyright which exists for the duration of the author's life plus an
additional fifty years, 217 while a copyright secured prior to January 1,
1964, remains subject to the split of authority created by the Frederick
Music and Marascalco decisions.218 Therefore, the dispute as to when the
renewal term vests remains relevant for works created before December 31,
214. H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 167 (1992). The Legislative History
describes several justifications for this legislation as follows:
First, the sanction for failure affirmatively to renew (that is, permanent and
irretrievable loss of copyright protection) is unduly harsh. Second, there has been
a showing that innocent parties inadvertently suffer such a loss. Third, the bill will
not impair existing "expectancies" or contractual interests in the renewal term.
Fourth, the bill will limit sanctions and facilitate socially beneficial activities
involving copyrighted works prior to an original term or a renewal registration.
Fifth, the bill promotes registration as a prerequisite to lawsuit as being in the public
interest.
Id. at 174.
215. H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 169 (1992), quoting S. REP. 473, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess. 117-18 (1975); H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1976).
216. § 102(g)(1)-(2), 106 Stat. at 266.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). However, an anonymous work, pseudonymous work or a
work made for hire exists for the duration of 75 years from the year of its first publication or 100
years from the year of creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1976).
218. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[A][2], at 9-66 to -67.
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1963, or in other words, for works which must have been renewed by
December 31, 1991.29 Furthermore, the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992
does not apply to any court proceedings pending as of June 26, 1992.1
Section 102 of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 states in part as
follows:
(a) Duration of Copyright: Subsisting Copyrights.-Section
304(a) of title 17, United States Code is amended to read as
follows:
(a) Copyrights in first Term on January 1, 1978.-
(1)(A) Any copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on
January 1, 1978, shall endure for 28 years from the date it was
originally secured.
[1](C) In the case of any other copyrighted work, ...
(i) the author of such work, if the author is still living,
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in
such work for a further term of 47 years.
[2](B) At the expiration of the original term of copyright in
a work specified in paragraph (1)(C) of this subsection, the
copyright shall endure for a renewed and extended further term
of 47 years, which-
(i) if an application to register a claim to such
further term has been made to the Copyright Office
within 1 year before the expiration of the original term
of copyright, and the claim is registered, shall vest,
upon the beginning of such further term, in any person
who is entitled under paragraph (1)(C) to the renewal
and extension of the copyright at the time the applica-
tion is made; or
(ii) if no such application is made or the claim
pursuant to such application is not registered, shall vest,
upon the beginning of such further term, in any person
entitled under paragraph (1)(C), as of the last day of
the original term of copyright, to the renewal and
extension of the copyright.
219. Id.
220. § 102(g)(3), 106 Stat. at 266.
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(3)(A) An application to register a claim to the renewed and
extended term of copyright in a work may be made to the Copy-
right Office-
(i) within 1 year before the expiration of the
original term of copyright by any person entitled under
paragraph (1)(B) or (C) to such further term of 47
years; and
(ii) at any time during the renewed and extended
term by any person in whom such further term vested,
under paragraph (2)(A) or (B), or by any successor or
assign of such person, if the application is made in the
name of such person.
(B) Such application is not a condition of the renewal and
extension of the copyright in a work for a further term of 47
years. 
1
2. When Does the Renewal Term Vest
The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 deletes the prerequisite of filing
a renewal application with the Copyright Office in the twenty-eighth year
as a condition of obtaining rights to the renewal term, thereby avoiding the
conflict as to whether the renewal term vests upon registration or upon
commencement of the renewal period.' The Copyright Renewal Act of
1992 provides that if there has been no registration for the extended term,
the forty-seven year renewal term will automatically vest at the end of the
original term of copyright.'
Although the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 creates a system of
automatic renewal, a strong inducement to register for the renewal period
remains.' If registration is secured during the twenty-eighth year, the
right to this extended term vests upon the beginning of the renewal term in
the person entitled at the time the renewal application is made.225 If there
is no registration during the twenty-eighth year, the renewal term is secured
by the automatic renewal provision, and the right to the extended term vests
in the person entitled to the renewal term on the last day of the initial term
221. § 102(a), 106 Stat. at 264-65 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
222. H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 172 (1992).
223. Ld.
224. ld. at 171.
225. § 102(a)(2)(B)(i), 106 Stat. at 265; H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 172
(1992).
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of copyright.' Therefore, if there has been no registration for the
renewal term during the twenty-eighth year and an author who has assigned
both terms of copyright is alive at the end of the initial term of copyright,
his or her assign may enforce their contractual right to the renewal term of
copyright. Alternatively, if there has been no registration for the renewal
term during the twenty-eighth year and an author who has assigned both
terms of copyright dies prior to the end of the initial term, his or her
statutory successors will be entitled to the renewal term. Even though the
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 provides a system of automatic renewal,
the renewal term will not ultimately vest in an assignee unless registration
has been made in the twenty-eighth year during the life of the author.
3. Procedural Benefits Accorded Those
Registering for the Renewal Term
Despite the creation of a system of automatic renewal, the prior
concept of renewal registration is not wholly discarded ' 7  Several
benefits are provided for a copyright owner who registers for the renewal
period.' For example, if renewal registration is made during the twenty-
eighth year, the owner of a derivative work is prevented from continued
exploitation of the derivative work and the certificate of registration is
prima facie evidence as to the validity of the renewal copyright.229
As stated, one benefit accorded those registering for the renewal term
of copyright involves the right to continued use of derivative works. In
Stewart v. Abend, ° the assignee of the original and renewal terms of
copyright created the film "Rear Window," a derivative work based upon
the original copyright. Because the author died before the renewal term
vested, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court
226. § 102(a)(2)(B)(ii), 106 Stat. at 265; H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 172
(1992).
227. The Renewal Act allows for registration to be made during the twenty eighth year, or
any time during the renewal period, but the benefits accorded those who register for the renewal
term will vary depending upon the timeliness of the registration. § 102(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), 106 Stat.
at 265.
228. NIMME, supra note 4, § 9.05[B][2], at 9-69. "Even as to works governed by the
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, the best practice is to register the renewal claim in the [twenty
eighth year].' Id.
229. § 102(a)(4)(A), (B), 106 Stat. at 265-66.
230. 495 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1989). See also Michael R. Diliberto, Looking Through the
"Rear Window": A Review of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Stewart v. Abend, 12
LoY. L.A. ENT. LJ. 299 (1992).
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of Appeals' decision, holding that the motion picture company could not
continue to exploit its derivative work.231 The Copyright Renewal Act
of 1992 provides that if renewal registration is made during the twenty-
eighth year, the rule of Stewart v. Abend remains in force, and the owner
of a derivative work is prevented from continued exploitation of the
derivative work, absent a license.32 Alternatively, the Copyright Renewal
Act of 1992 provides that if no registration for the renewal term is made
during the twenty-eighth year and, therefore, the renewal term is obtained
by the automatic renewal provision, then a derivative work prepared
pursuant to a grant made during the initial term may continue to be
exploited during the renewal term.33
Another benefit accorded those registering for the renewal term of
copyright involves the evidentiary weight accorded the certificate of
registration. In Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the certificate of renewal registration was
not prima facie proof of the facts stated therein or of the validity of the
renewal copyright.' -  The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 provides that
if registration for the renewal term is made after the twenty-eighth year, the
rule in Epoch remains in force, and the evidentiary weight given to the
certificate of registration will be within the discretion of the court. 35
Alternatively, if registration for the renewal term is made during the
twenty-eighth year, the certificate of registration constitutes prima facie
evidence as to the validity of the copyright in the renewal term. 6
The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 provides an author the opportuni-
ty to register for the renewal term even if no registration has been made for
the original term of copyright; however, the Register of Copyrights may
request information with respect to the existence, ownership, or duration of
the copyright for the original term.3 This opportunity for an author to
231. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 216.
232. § 102(a)(4)(A), 106 Stat. at 265. -This incentive to make renewal registration parallels
the derivative works clause of the termination provisions of section 203 and 304(c) of title 17[sic],
United States Code." H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 180 (1992).
233. § 102(a)(4)(A), 106 Stat. at 265. The statute expressly prohibits the creation of
additional derivative works. Id
234. Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 745-46 (2d Cir. 1975).
235. Id.
236. § 102(a)(4)(B), 106 Stat. at 266.
237. § 102(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 266. This section states as follows:
(b) Registration.-() Section 409 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"If an application is submitted for the renewed and extended term provided for in
section 304(a)(3)(A) and an original term registration has not been made, the
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"cure" his or her failure to register the copyright will ensure authors all
available remedies for infringements occurring after registration"3
IV. CONCLUSION
In response to the Frederick Music and Marascalco conflict, Congress
created the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992. Although the Copyright
Renewal Act of 1992 has resolved many of the vesting conflicts created by
the prior Copyright Acts, the amendment is only applicable to copyrights
initially protected by federal copyright law during the fourteen year period
between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977. 2 9 As explained, the
split of authority created by the Frederick Music and Marascalco decisions
remains in force for works initially protected by copyright law prior to
January 1, 1964.m
Although pursuant to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 the renewal
term does not technically vest until commencement of the renewal term, the
time of registration is the determinative date.2" Therefore, as recom-
mended in this Article, the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 is more
reflective of the "vesting upon registration" view than the "vesting upon
commencement of the renewal period" view. 2 This "vesting upon
registration" view should also be followed for copyrights secured before
January 1, 1964.
A copyright is a valuable right given to the author. As explained, the
author is allowed to assign both the initial and renewal terms of this
copyright.243 Although the author must be alive when this copyright is
renewed during the last year of the initial term of copyright for works
Register may request information with respect to the existence, ownership, or
duration of the copyright for the original term."
Id (emphasis added).
238. H. R. REP. No. 379, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 166, 173 (1992).
239. § 102(g)(1)-(2), 106 Stat. at 266.
240. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[AI[2], at 9-66 to -67.
241. § 102(a)(2)(B)(i), 106 Stat. at 265. This section states in part:
At the expiration of the original term ... the copyright shall endure for a renewed
... term... if an application... has been made... within 1 year before expiration
of the original term ... shall vest.., upon beginning of such further term, in any
person... entitled ... to the renewal... at the time the application is made ....
Id (emphasis added).
242. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05[C][1][c], at 9-81. "Thus, at the same time that the
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 nominally adopted Marascalco's pro-heir time of vesting, in
reality the upshot is much more in line with Sickler's pro-grantee result." Id
243. Fred Fisher Music, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943).
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initially protected by federal copyright law before January 1, 1964, § 304(a)
of the 1976 Copyright Act does not require that the author survive until the
beginning of the renewal term.'
In order to avoid the plain meaning of § 304(a) of the 1976 Copyright
Act, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Marascalco case, uncon-
vincingly determined that the statute was not clear on its face. 45 This
reading of the statute enabled the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to go
beyond the plain meaning of the statute and interpret the legislative history.
After acknowledging that there is no longer an express survivorship
requirement in the statute, the court determined that the renewal provisions
still contain the substance of the early copyright acts that contained a
survivorship requirement.' Although no legislative history was cited to
explain why Congress deleted the survivorship requirement, the court
determined that there is still such a requirement because a case deciding the
issue of alienability of copyright stated that the renewal provisions of the
1909 Act were a continuation of prior copyright laws.247 However, the
authority which supports the Marascalco holding is unpersuasive.
The renewal term for federal copyrights secured prior to January 1,
1964, should vest upon registration with the Copyright Office, in the
twenty-eighth year of the initial term, during the life of the author. The
plain meaning of the statute, the lack of legislative history explaining why
the survivorship requirement was deleted, the strong dicta and the
overwhelming commentary all support this view. Additionally, the "vesting
upon registration" approach will finalize the legal rights of all the interested
parties, avoid unnecessary and accidental loss of copyrights to the public
domain, and recognize the publisher's interest in copyright. Finally, the
"vesting upon registration" approach is consistent with the renewal
provisions embodied in the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992.
244. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
245. Marascalco, 953 F.2d at 470-71.
246. l at 471.
247. Id. at 472.
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